Showing posts with label Rosa Vaz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rosa Vaz. Show all posts

Monday, 14 October 2013

James Walker, Lambeth Council, MP Simon Hughes


181. By letter to the Respondent dated 9 September 2010 the Claimant wrote a letter of resignation to Pat Petch, pages 1577-1580. The Claimant's letter of resignation included the following


Your failure to demonstrate a balanced and fair approach to the preparation to the hearing planned for May 2010 raised huge doubts and these have not been alleviated. For example why you spent 18 months conducting an investigation, you gave me only 10 days to respond to .:5 ring binders of evidence and prepare a defence, at a time when I was suffering from depression. You also reversed the order, intending to deal with the non Penny Bermingham allegations first, where that was said to be the basis of my suspension You failed to respond to my request for an independent disciplinary panel to be appointed I still hope that once I have pointed out some of the obvious flaws in the allegations, some form of common sense would prevail.
However, any last hope that I would be treated with fairness was lost completely when I was finally able to look at some of the evidence and speak to some of the witnesses.
As you know from your occupational health doctor and his extensive reports, the treatment I have received from my employer has had a detrimental and harmful impact on my mental health. You will be aware I was suffering from anxiety and depression and thus had to seek support from my GP and others. Though I continue to suffer psychological injuries this support has made some limited improvement to my mental health. As a result of this slight improvement, I have finally been able to consider some of the extensive documentation you submitted as part of your disciplinary evidence. Despite taking receipt of five folders from May 2010 when these were delivered to Collyer Bristow the severity of my depression meant I lacked the strength and capacity to view the material previously.
I was deeply shocked by the contents of your files and found these demonstrated a totally biased and prejudiced approach had been taken towards me throughout your investigations and proceedings. My recent discussions with witnesses and a review of the documentation has also provided evidence of unfair treatment.
 For example, I have discovered that there was a:-
 1)    Failure to provide both witnesses and myself with specific detailed allegations of what I was accused of.
 2)    Failure to clarify the division of responsibility between other individuals and bodies who had overlapping responsibilities and duties for the matters under consideration.
 3)    The inclusion of an allegation purportedly made by John Parr which he had indicated in writing that he did not want to make.
 4)    Compilation of witness evidence from people who had never met me, nor been involved in the school at the time when I was responsible for the management of the school, which contrast with the failure to interview key witnesses e.g. members of the school's governing body.
 5)    Disregard crucial witness evidence from friends of Penny Bermingham which undermine the integrity of her evidence. There was a failure to investigate this evidence independently and in a prompt and confidential manner.
 6)    Continuing repetition of allegations which relate to the period when I was undergoing chemotherapy treatment without any attempt to find out if my illness might have affected me.
 7)    Presentation of written evidence, particularly relating to school's finances in a partial incomplete manner and without corroboration which leads to a distorted picture.
 8)    Failure to act on allegations of bullying behaviour by Penny Bermingham towards myself and others and to reconsider your judgments against me in the light of revelations, which demonstrates biased and a lack of even handiness.
 9)    Procuring the destruction of my files and a fraud investigation into how that came about. The files were contained in seven filing cabinets and there appears to be little or nothing done to question those who were known to be responsible for taking the decision to clear the office.
10) Failure to carry out the investigations in a prompt and ordered way in order to secure an accurate account of events and confidentiality within the investigation. It is now nearly two years since my suspension. The reasons for suspension have changed without me being informed.
11) Failure to act in an even handed way by asking witnesses questions about Penny Bermingham's behaviour towards me and instead only focussing on the converse. This was in spite of assurances from the Chief Executive last year that my grievances against Penny would be investigated as part of this process.
 12) Failure to properly and accurately set out minutes of witness meetings which reflected the true nature and content of what people had said. In many cases witnesses said criticism of Penny's behaviour which were left out or played down and the positive comments about me were rewritten to convey a negative meaning. Furthermore all witnesses waited months for minutes to be sent only to find that they were inaccurate.
In addition to the above having experienced excessive and unjust treatment from both the IEB and Lambeth council for other two years and having been isolated out of the workplace for nearly two years, I remain worried about my health. Having endured bullying and harassment from my employer for two years, at a time when I was recovering from cancer, I had hoped that a more reasonable approached would be adopted. I can no longer continue with this situation, as I believe it poses significant risks to my health and well-being.
 In outline, some of the core factors have been:
 i)     suspending me in the first place and then failing at any time to review the need for suspension despite there being specific reasons to review.
 ii)    repeated failures to engage your obligations with reasonable adjustments in relation to the application of performance and disciplinary procedures.
 iii)   an unnecessary and extended suspension;
 iv) failure to provide access to my person management files and records which I required to defend myself against your allegations;
 v)    failure to properly investigate the circumstances surrounding the destruction of my personal files and property from my office and having destroyed them in the first place;
vi)   a failure to prevent me from becoming isolated from the work environment. Since November 2009 no one from the LEA or IEB has spoken to me or met with me.
 Henry Fawcett Primary School was extremely important to me both on a personal and professional level. I was hugely committed to the pupils, their parents and the talented staff that taught under me. Whatever judgments you have made, the fact remains the school was successful under my management. As you know my leadership and management was praised by two Ofsted inspections and described as "good" and during the last year I achieved 74% in the SATS results. While achievement was important to me I took immense satisfaction from the fact that I was able to work with my staff to create a happy and secure environment for children at Henry Fawcett."
 182. The Claimant presented his second claim form to the Tribunal complaining of constructive unfair dismissal on 9 September, 2010.
 Submissions
 183. The Tribunal heard submission from Ms Fraser-Butlin on behalf of the Respondent and from the Claimant. Both the Claimant and Ms Fraser-Butlin on behalf of the Respondent supplemented their oral submissions with written submissions. The parties' submissions are not repeated in these reasons. The Tribunal was also provided by Ms Fraser-Butlin with a lever arch file of authorities and the Claimant also referred the Tribunal to authorities in his submission. The Tribunal considered all the authorities to which we were referred.
 The Law
 Disability Discrimination
 184. There was no issue that the Claimant's condition of cancer meant that he was a disabled person for the purposes of the DDA 1995. Ms Fraser-Butlin submitted that following the 'all clear' when the Claimant returned to work he should be treated as a person with a past disability. Where a Claimant has a past disability there is no duty on the Respondent to make reasonable adjustments However, in any event, even where a Claimant has a disability, the Claimant has to establish a particular disadvantage caused by that disability for the duty on the Respondent employer to take reasonable adjustments to arise.


185. The statutory framework is set out as follows
Section 3A of Disability Discrimination Act 1995
 (1) For the purposes of this Part, a person also discriminates against a disabled person if—
 (a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply, and
 (b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.
 (5) A person directly discriminates against a disabled person if, on the ground of the disabled person's disability, he treats the disabled person less favourably than he treats or would treats person not having that particular disability whose relevant circumstances, including his abilities, are the same as, or not materially different from, those of the disabled person
 186. Following London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm [2008J IRLR 700 HL the appropriate comparator in cases of direct and disability related discrimination are the same namely the comparator's circumstances is someone whose circumstances are the same or not materially different from that of the Claimant.

187. Section 4A of the Act provides.-
 (1) Where -
 (a) a provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer, or
 (b) any physical feature of premises occupied by the employer, places the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled, it is the duty of the employer to take such steps as it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to have to take in order to prevent the provision, criterion or practice, or feature, having that effect.
 188. Section 3B of the Act provides
 (1) For the purposes of this Part, a person subjects a disabled person to harassment where, for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of-
(a) violating the disabled person's dignity, or
 (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him.
 (2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) only if, having regard to all the circumstances, including In particular the perception of the disabled person, it should reasonably be considered as having that effect."
 189. Section 17A of the DDA contains burden of proof provisions, namely
 (IC) Where, on the hearing of a complaint under subsection(1), the complainant proves facts from which the Tribunal could, apart from this subsection that the respondent has acted in a way which is unlawful under this Part, the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not so act.
190. Section 55 of the Act contains provisions relating to victimisation and provides that
 a person ("A") discriminates against another person ("B") if -
 (a) he treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat another person whose circumstances are the same as B and


(b) he does so for a reason mentioned in sub section(2).
 Subsection (2) lists a number of reasons, including alleging that A (the Respondent) has contravened the DDA. It is conceded that the Claimant's grievance dated 27 February 2009 amounts to a protected act.
Unfair constructive dismissal
191. Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and only if) -
...(c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.
192. To found a complaint of constructive dismissal the Claimant has to show that his resignation has been caused or justified by a fundamental or repudiatory breach of his contract of employment by the Respondent employer, namely a breach which goes the very root of the contract between them; in other words conduct on the part of the employer which evidences the employer treating the contract of employment as discharged. In the circumstances of this case the Claimant alleged that the Respondent's conduct involved breaches of the term of trust and confidence implied into his contract of employment.
193. In Malik —v- BCCI [1997] ICR 606, HL, the implied term of trust and confidence was defined as:
 The employer shall not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee.
 194. The Claimant also contended that the alleged discriminatory conduct of the Respondent involved repudiatory breaches of his contract of employment
 Conclusions
 195. The Tribunal reached its conclusions having regard to the totality of the evidence, to the submissions of Ms Fraser-Butlin on behalf of the Respondent and of the Claimant and to the relevant law.
Constructive unfair dismissal
 196. Clause 6 of the Management Guidance to the Respondent's disciplinary procedure provided the following:
 "6.1 Head Teachers conduct in relation to how the disciplinary procedure, investigation or suspension is handled must be such as not to damage the relationship of confidence and trust which exists between employer and employee.
 6.2 To discharge their duties and avoid stress claims Head Teachers should:
 Act decisively
 • Head Teachers should project, manage each situation, set out a realistic action plan and timetable at the outset and stick to it. The plan should incorporate the appropriate sections of the Disciplinary and other relevant Procedures, so the processes are not flawed for want of procedure. procrastination and indecisive management when dealing with these issues are more likely to give rise to stress and psychological injury claims.
• Where possible avoid delay
 Investigations, suspension and disciplinary proceedings can be stressful for employees, this is particularly true when the employee has been suspended and effectively withdrawn from the workplace. Delay in these circumstances is likely to exacerbate the stress felt by the employee. It is Important therefore that the resolution process is as streamlined as possible.
 • Stay connected with the employee


Keeping in regular contact, and where this unexpected delay in the process, inform the employee so its expectations are managed. If investigations become protracted regular contact with the individuals should be maintained by the Head Teacher and/or human resources and the employee should be notified as soon as practicable once the investigations have been completed.
• Manage the situation sensitively
 While delays should be avoided, so should over enthusiastic management. Keep all employees concerned involved in the process by giving regular updates."
 197. Under clause 8 headed "disciplinary investigation” clause 8.3 provided the following:
 In an informal investigation the following steps should be taken:
 • Obtain as much relevant information as possible: what happened, when and where, interview the complainant and any witness and obtain written statements where relevant, which should be signed and dated by the interviewee and a copy given to the interviewee. Notes should be taken of all interviews and these should be kept in case they are required by the employee or the panel at any hearing.
The person under investigation should be invited to attend for an investigatory meeting at the earliest opportunity, as should all witnesses to an incident or those that can shed light on the event."
 198. Clause 8.5 provided the following
 "The purpose of the investigation is to establish all the relevant facts and evidence which may lead to disciplinary action being taken by the Head Teacher e.g. warnings, which will need to be considered at a formal disciplinary hearing In carrying out the investigation, it should be understood the investigation any interviews conducted with the employee concerned in order to establish the relevant facts are not a formal disciplinary hearing.
 199. Clause 8.9 provided the following:
 "Care should be taken in preparing any charges if formal action is to be taken. Each charge shall be well argued and researched. It is also advisable to link any charge of a specific breach of a disciplinary rule. Care should also be taken to keep charges simple. Governing bodies and Head Teachers should seek to identify the actual allegation other than simply claiming a breach of rule "x" may not be reasonable and may therefore result in postponements. Ideally the Head Teacher should state the employer charged with doing X on Y date (S in breach of Rule Z.)
 200. The Tribunal throughout the hearing expressed its concerns about the delay in the entire disciplinary process involving the Claimant. The Claimant had been suspended at the end of November 2008 but had not been given any details of the allegations against him apart from five bulleted allegations in his suspension letter dated 28 November 2008, pages 414 —415.
 201. It was not until 18 December 2008 that the Claimant was provided with any information relating to the disciplinary process namely that the investigating officers would be Barry Gilhooly and Mary White, Human Resources Consultant.
202. The Tribunal considered the choice of Barry Gilhooly as the investigation officer in circumstances when he was about to go on extended leave to be unacceptable in circumstances of a suspension. The Tribunal was driven to the conclusion that no priority was given by the Respondent to the Claimant's position and to the duty of care it owed to the Claimant as outlined in clause 6 of the Management guidance to its disciplinary procedure. We found that no consideration was given to the inevitable delay that the appointment of Mr Gilhooly would cause to the investigatory process.
 203. It was not until Mary White's letter to the Claimant dated 8 January 2009 that the Claimant was provided with any particulars of the allegations against the Claimant. We noted that such allegations included John Parr's allegations of 21 November 2008 which he had expressly requested should not be used against the Claimant.


204. We found that the whole process undertaken by Barry Gilhooly was flawed and that it was as wide ranging as possible to amass as much negative evidence against the Claimant as possible. On several occasions during the hearing the Tribunal enquired why the investigation had taken so long in circumstances of an allegation by one teacher against another. The Tribunal never received a satisfactory explanation for the delay or why in circumstances of an allegation of bullying and harassment against Penny Bermingham, Witnesses who had not been directly involved with the allegations, were asked question relating to the Claimant's management style and on some occasions whether they had been bullied by the Claimant.
205. We noted that two of the potential witnesses most closely involved with Penny Bermingham namely the Assistant Head Teacher, Emma Bilsdon was not interviewed until 9 November 2009, almost a year after the Claimant's suspension. We found that Mr Gilhooly's investigation was one sided and judgmental in its approach as evidenced in his findings. We noted that any negative observations about Penny Bermingham were explained away by him without any of the matters being put to Penny Bermingham.
 206. The nature of the investigation and the delays we conclude evidenced an intention on the part of the Respondent to treat the Claimant's contract of employment as discharged, in circumstances where we found that the Respondent failed to have any regard to the relationship of trust and confidence which should exist between employer and employee. Whatever the concerns about the Claimant's management of the school, the Claimant was entitled to be treated in a manner consistent with his rights as an employee and to be treated fairly throughout the investigatory process. This we conclude the Respondent wholly failed to achieve.
207. Sitting as an industrial jury we bore in mind that a number of members of staff and other individuals connected with the school might well have had a poor opinion of the Claimant even to the point of disliking him and finding him uncongenial. However even taking account of the dynamics of working and professional relationships, which might well give rise to feelings of antagonism, we were nevertheless disturbed about the level of hostility expressed by some of the witnesses against the Claimant during the disciplinary process. We found that there was an unjustifiable acceptance that Penny Bermingham's allegations against the Claimant were well founded even before the conclusion of the investigation process. Barry Gilhooly clearly accepted Penny Bermingham's allegations and adopted an approach which we found was motivated by an endeavour to obtain as much material which was damaging to the Claimant as possible.
 208. This approach was also reflected in the second disciplinary investigation which was not concerned with allegations of bullying, but with financial and other alleged mismanagement by the Claimant. Thus John -Marr who was interviewed about health and safety and financial management was asked in terms about whether it was true that the Claimant had bullied and harassed him.
 209. The Tribunal concluded that Matt Britt's conduct in relation to the clearing of the Claimant's office was inexcusable. We were unable to accept his evidence that only material which was old and which he considered had no relevance was destroyed and we accepted the evidence of John Marr that a large amount of material was bagged for removal. Matt Britt gave no explanation as to why the Claimant had not been consulted before he took steps to clear the office particularly in circumstances where the Claimant had occupied the office for a number of years. Matt Britt was forced to accept in cross examination that, with hindsight, he should have done.
210. The Tribunal concluded that the Claimant's office was cleared in circumstances of the expectation that the Claimant would not be returning to the school. We found Matt Britt had said to John Marr, who had queried Matt Britt’s instruction that he wanted to clear the office, that the Claimant was not coming back. Again we conclude that such conduct was not consistent with the relationship of trust and confidence which should exist between employer and employee.
211 We did not consider that the Respondent was genuinely motivated by considerations of policy, when it decided to treat the Claimant's grievances against Penny Bermingham as a complaint, the effect of which was justified by the Respondent as delaying the disciplinary investigation process The Claimant's grievances against Local Authority officers did not, we consider, impact upon the allegations by Penny Bermingham of bullying and harassment by the Claimant.
212. As it happened the Claimant's allegations against Penny Bermingham were never properly investigated and Penny Bermingham herself was unaware that the Claimant had raised a grievance against her. Penny Bermingham, of course, had been interviewed on 29 January 2009 a month before the Claimant had raised his grievance and accordingly was never interviewed about the matter. We accept the Claimant's submission that he was treated differently from Penny Bermingham. The grievance process did not appear to require that a disciplinary investigatory process should be held up until after the conclusion of a grievance. In any event the Tribunal noted that Mr Gilhooly himself stated that he viewed the Penny Bermingham allegations against the Claimant and the Claimant's grievance about Penny Bermingham as different sides of the same coin.
213. Ms Fraser-Butlin submitted that the Tribunal must consider what would have happened if the Claimant had not resigned and what the percentage likelihood is that he would have been dismissed in any event
 214. Ms Fraser Butlin referred the Tribunal to paragraph 2551 of Harveys, namely:
 Where evidence is adduced as to what would have happened had proper procedures been complied with, there are a number of potential findings a Tribunal could make In some cases it may be clear that the employee would have been retained if proper procedures had been adopted. In such cases the full compensatory award should be made. In others, the Tribunal may conclude that dismissal would have include in any event this may result in a small additional compensatory award only to take account of any additional period for which the employee would have been employed had the proper procedures been carried out into effect (CEG Mining supplies (Longwall) Ltd v Baker (1988) ICR 676). In other circumstances it may be impossible to make a determination one way or another. It is in those cases that the (Employment) Tribunal must make a percentage assessment of the likelihood that the employee would have been retained, as suggested in Sillifant v Powell Duffryn Timber Ltd."
215. The Tribunal endeavoured to evaluate what the outcome of a fair hearing might have achieved. First we considered that any reasonable employer would have separated the Penny Bermingham's allegations from the allegations of mismanagement, financial and otherwise.
 216. Secondly we had concerns that the allegations of mismanagement involved matters which might more appropriately have been dealt with as issues of capability rather than issues of misconduct. This employer plainly failed to even consider that distinction. We noted that the Respondent had commissioned reports about its concerns namely the report into the TOIL issues which was dated 16 March 2009 in relation to the CRB issues 'without engaging the Claimant and it was not until 2 July 2009 that the Claimant was informed that all the matters of concern, which had been considered for some time would be investigated.
217. The Claimant himself, as we found, was very significantly disadvantaged by the fact that many of his records had been destroyed. We were unable to assess what a rigorous investigation of any school in the Respondent borough might have revealed, and whether the situation was unique to the Henry Fawcett school.
 218. In his evidence to the Tribunal Mr Jethwa stated that the Henry Fawcett School was one of a handful of schools, namely five or six schools, being in deficit. We found it difficult to assess the extent to which the Claimant's illness and his absence from the school together with his suspension should have been taken into account by a reasonable employer in evaluating the blameworthiness or performance of the Claimant.
 219. In relation to health and safety there was a Premises Manager at the school, John Marr and a Facilities Manager, Mike James who had been appointed by the Claimant. John Marr's evidence was not challenged namely that every year from 1999 there had been major developments and work at the school including the refurbishment of the toilets and kitchen, rewiring of the boiler room and that the school worked closely with the Respondent's premises staff on such projects.
220. At the time the Claimant went off sick in February 2009 there were major works being undertaken in resurfacing the roof and replacing the school's windows. The Claimant also arranged for the contractor to give a health and safety talk to pupils in assembly. Notwithstanding the issues which surfaced following the Claimant's suspension, we did not consider that this was a case where the Claimant had ignored or turned a blind eye to his responsibilities.
 221. Again in relation to TOIL we found that the Claimant had sought HR advice from Carol Palmer about the merits of the TOIL proposal.
 222. In relation to the CRB issue, there were seven CRBs which were out of date going as far back as 2006, the effect of which was that staff were operating in a school with out of date CRB checks. Clearly this was a serious issue, but the Claimant's evidence, which went unchallenged, was that the system he had adopted had been vetted by Ofsted. The system was to involve asking staff to put in CRB applications when they became due.


223. It had been the Claimant's intention to review procedures before going on sick leave and that he had not been informed of any concerns when he returned to work. We considered there was some force in the Claimant's contention in his evidence that the CRB matter only became an issue when he refused a compromise offer.
 224. The Tribunal considered that the most serious matter was the financial issue. The Claimant himself was clearly concerned about the school's finances before he went on sick leave and the school was insolvent.
 225. In her written submissions to the Tribunal Ms Fraser-Butlin succinctly itemised the financial issues. It was clear that the Claimant was extremely concerned about the school budget issue while he was away sick and on any view the Claimant's approach to his budgetary responsibilities was muddled. Thus the Claimant was unable to accept that capital and revenue monies should not be mixed in accounts.
 226. In December 2007 the school was in deficit to the extent of £141,684.75 (page 4839) as evidenced in a 2007/08 income and expenditure forecast initialled by the Claimant. The financial position was complicated by the additional factor of the Children Centre which was ultimately paid during the year 2008/2009. The governors were unaware of the payroll liability and the school deficit until they were informed of the deficit in April 2008 and the Claimant informed them of the figures after his return to work in October 2008.
227. Although the school's finances were clearly a matter of concern to the Claimant we found that there was some force in the Claimant's submissions that if the Respondent had long term concerns about the school's financial position why such concerns had not been raised before the Claimant's suspension and action taken at an earlier stage. The Claimant himself had raised concerns about the viability of the Children's Centre. The Governing Body had become aware of the deficit in April 2008 and the Claimant himself had informed the governing body of the figures in October 2008.
 228. We found that the Penny Bermingham issues leading to the Claimant's suspension coloured the entire disciplinary processes which followed. In the absence of the Penny Bermingham issues we concluded that all the matters covered by the second disciplinary investigation would, on the balance of probabilities, have been dealt with by any reasonable employer by way of performance issues and that any necessary remedial steps should have been dealt with by engaging with the Claimant in an endeavour to place the school on a more viable financial footing.
229. We found that no evaluation was made in relation to the impact of the Claimant's absence from the school in 2008 and any failings on the part of the interim management team. We found that the Respondent had prioritised the removal of the Claimant from the school and maintaining his removal through a disciplinary process rather than raising and addressing any concerns with him in his role as Head Teacher. The wholly unjustified destruction of the Claimant's records and the remark by Matt Britt to John Parr namely that the Claimant was not coming back we considered evidenced the Respondent's approach in the starkest terms.
 230. The Respondent provided no explanation why it treated concerns about the Claimant's management of the school as disciplinary matters and we consider that there is considerable force in the Claimant's submission that his rejection of the compromise officer against the background of the Penny Bermingham allegations, which occurred sometime before the commencement of the Jason Preece investigation about which the Claimant was informed five months later in July 2009, was a determining factor.
 231. We concluded that the Respondent's treatment of the Claimant failed to treat him in a manner consistent with the existence of an employment relationship. The delays in the Penny Bermingham investigation which on the evidence the Tribunal found were wholly unjustified, the clearing of the Claimant's office without reference to the Claimant and the destruction of his files, the failure to provide the Claimant with any details of the Penny Bermingham complaints notwithstanding his suspension, for a period, the wholly unjustified draconian initial conditions of his suspension, the failure to adopt impartiality during the investigation process and what we found was the motivation on the part of the investigation officers, particularly Mr Gilhooly, to undertake an investigation to paint the Claimant in the most damaging light.
232. We concluded that the Respondent had prioritised the removal of the Claimant from the school. It may well have been the case that the Penny Bermingham allegations were used as a "stalking horse" to achieve such a result. We noted that Phyllis Dunipace herself had stated at an investigation hearing into the Claimant in May 2009 although referring to the main concern at the time of Claimant's suspension being his behaviour, also added the following:
“...but I also had to take into account the school's improvement. We had a termly voluntary meeting which we would look at long term reports or advice in terms of what was going in records. We would also examine Ofsted reports, financial information, audit reports, whether the school was in deficit...”
233. We were satisfied that the Claimant would not have received a fair hearing and that the only result of the disciplinary hearing would have been his dismissal. In reaching such conclusion the Tribunal had not embarked upon a sea of speculation, but had reached its determination on its evaluation and assessment of the Respondent's conduct so far as it impacted upon the Claimant in the period starting with the Claimant's admission to hospital in February 2008 and the Claimant's resignation in September 2010.
 234. Had the matters the subject of the second investigation been treated as performance issues addressed with the active engagement of the Claimant, and the Penny Bermingham matter been considered in isolation from such issues, approaches which, we consider, a reasonable employer should have adopted, the Claimant would not have been threatened with dismissal by a reasonable employer.
235. The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent's treatment of the Claimant from the manner in which it reacted to the Penny Birmingham allegations, commencing with the Claimant's suspension and its subsequent conduct of the disciplinary process involving the Claimant involved breaches of the term of trust and confidence on the part of the Respondent which went to the very root of the employment relationship. The Tribunal found that the entire process was motivated by an intention on the part of the Respondent to achieve the removal of the Claimant from his role at the school. The Respondent by its conduct had failed to deal or engage with the Claimant as an employee.
 236. Turning to the issue of whether the Claimant had delayed too long before his resignation the Tribunal concluded that it was not until September 2010 that the Claimant was in a position to make an informed decision about his resignation. The Claimant had been written to on 30 April 2010 (pages 1513-1517) by Pat Petch informing him that he was to attend a formal disciplinary hearing commencing less than three weeks later on 18 May 2010 to face very substantial charges against him, namely the Penny Birmingham allegations under the first investigation by Mr Gilhooly and 11 charges under the second disciplinary investigation conducted by Jason Preece. The Tribunal considered that the reply by the Claimant's solicitors to Ms Petch dated 14 May 2010 pages 1519-1523 put the Claimant's position in clear terms, namely:-
 We read your letter dated 30 April 2010 with a mixture of shock, incredulity and sadness or concern. In view of how our client has been treated to date, perhaps we should not be surprised that the letter amounts to a further chapter in the Council's determined attempt to remove him. It is a further example of victimisation against our client for raising grievances and for making protected disclosures. It caused extreme distress and a sharp deterioration in his health and we attach a sick note confirming that he is not fit to attend the hearing. This is of particular significance since no one from the LA has phoned or met our client since the end of November 2009.
 237. The letter requested a postponement of the hearing which was granted and the Respondent arranged for the Claimant to be examined by Occupational Health.
 238. The Tribunal accepted the Claimant's evidence that he was not in a fit state to consider the very significant volume of documentation which had been generated by both investigations. The Tribunal has commented before in these reasons that we found no reason why the Penny Birmingham investigation could not have been concluded at a much earlier stage and the Tribunal had no satisfactory or adequate explanation from the Respondent why an earlier conclusion to such investigation had not been achieved. The Claimant's state of mind and health at the time is evidenced by the contents of the Occupational Health report dated 21 May 2010, C18. The report included the following:-
Although he recovered from cancer treatment in 2008, there were difficulties at the school after his return. He has now been off work and suffered with depression and anxiety for many months. I saw him on 4 November 2009 and suggested a speedy resolution and some suggestions about possible conduct of any interviews. He had a welfare meeting on 19 November 2009 which, unfortunately, he felt was unsympathetic and very upsetting, and which he felt did not progress matters at all and which made him tearful and seemed to worsen his condition. There has been no contact since, although he would have appreciated supportive emails or letters. His next contact was a letter of 30 April 2010 with dates for planned disciplinary hearing, and detailing charges against him. His lawyer replied in detail with a letter, and the dates passed. Meanwhile, although he had antidepressant medication for some weeks, and some 20 sessions of counselling, there has been no improvement, and his psychological condition has continued to deteriorate.
 I. Present Situation
 He has been worse in the last few months, with very little sleep, and increasing tearfulness. In fact he has suicidal feelings. His condition has affected his family, and his wife and children have also suffered. Another significant obstacle is his annual cancer check scan which is due on 29 July 2010.
 ii. Specific Questions
 His psychological condition is deteriorating, and I am concerned. He is suffering from an acute anxiety state with some depressive symptoms. I do not feel that this condition is consistent with a further interview or hearing at present, and I do not consider he is fit to instruct a representative, understand allegations, or follow proceedings, which factors are the principle test for fitness to attend hearings. Although you asked specific questions about when he will be fit to attend, I am unable to take this further at present
 iii. Further Plans
 In my opinion he will benefit from urgent specialist psychiatric assessment for advice and possible treatment. I am writing to his GP with a copy of this letter. I have given him a recommendation for a self-help book. Please ask us to see him again in one month's time, and we can advise you further.
 239. The Tribunal accepted the Claimant's evidence and his submission that it was not possible for him to consider the disciplinary investigations when they were delivered which had been compiled over an 18 month period and amounted to five large ring binders. It was not until the late summer 2010 that the Claimant was in a position to consider the very significant amount of documentation and to make an informed judgment about the Respondent's approach throughout the prolonged disciplinary process. We conclude that the Claimant's resignation was triggered by the Respondent's conduct culminating in his dismissal.
 240. The Tribunal found on the evidence, that the entire investigatory process had been motivated by the Respondent's intention to achieve the removal of the Claimant from the school. The Tribunal concluded that in the circumstances there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the Claimant before he resigned from his employment by his letter dated 9 September 2010.
 241. It is the unanimous judgment of the Tribunal that the Claimant was unfairly, constructively dismissed by the Respondent.
Disability Discrimination
242. The Tribunal was unable to accept Ms Fraser-Butlin's submission that when the Claimant returned to work in September 2008 he had a past disability. The Claimant was fit to return to work in September 2008 but was still subjected to routine scans and we noted that nearly two years later the occupational health report of 21 May 2010 referred to the Claimant's annual cancer check scan due on 29 July 2010 as a significant obstacle to the Claimant's general wellbeing, C18. Further the Respondent Lambeth Legal Services in a letter to the Claimant's then solicitors dated 15 June 2010, page 1544 stated the following:-
i. We see from your witness synopsis that you intend to call your client's oncologist to give evidence. You will recall the issue of medical evidence had been raised previously. On 16 March the Tribunal ordered that the parties try to agree directions in respect of medical evidence. On 19 March you wrote to the Tribunal and strongly disputed the need for medical evidence. On 25 March we conceded that your client was disabled and had been at all material times and that there was now no need for medical evidence.
 ii. It is clear from your synopsis that Dr Harper's evidence will be expert evidence. If expert evidence is now considered to have been unnecessary then we consider that it would be appropriate for you to first explore that with the Tribunal and, if they consider that will be necessary, the parties can then try to agree appropriate directions.
 243. The Tribunal considered that in June 2010, the Respondent accepted that the Claimant was someone who clearly remained vulnerable as a result of cancer check scans. Further in a report dated 15 December 2010, C32/1 from the Claimant's consultant medical oncologist, Dr Peter Harper. Dr Harper stated the following:-
 i.     Post operatively the diagnosis was made that the cancer had arisen for testicular cancer. The testicular cancer itself was resected.
 ii.    Thereafter he came under my care for combination chemotherapy. The combination chemotherapy used in metastatic testicular cancers is one of the most aggressive chemotherapies we use in every day oncology.
 iii.   As ever in these cancers, although we hope the prognosis is excellent, we cannot give the reassurances the patient would like and there is no doubt that Mr Walker had been under considerable stress.
 244. We conclude that the Claimant was disabled for the purposes of the DDA at all material times.
 245. The Claimant had raised a grievance alleging harassment, victimisation and bullying and acts of discrimination under the DDA as early as 27 February 2009 which was supported by a statement of grievance enclosed in his letter to the Respondent's Chief Executive Derek Anderson dated 24 March 2009 pages 580-601.
 246. We approached the allegations of victimisation with some caution. The Respondent had already embarked on a course of conduct involving the Claimant's suspension and the Penny Bermingham investigation before the protected act of February 2009. Further we concluded that for its own reasons the Respondent was motivated by an intention to achieve the Claimant's removal from his post of Head Teacher at the school. Accordingly there was clearly no causal link between the Penny Bermingham investigation and the protected act.
 247. Although the Tribunal rejected Mrs Fraser-Butlin's submission that the reason for the treatment of the Claimant was because of the seriousness of the allegations and the need to investigate them, we accepted her contention at paragraph 108 of her submissions, namely that:
What is striking is that the Claimant's position has been that the Respondent was seeking to dismiss him before he lodged his grievances. Therefore this cannot be victimisation.
 248. We concluded that the treatment complained of by the Claimant was not on grounds of any protected act and accordingly the Claimant's complaint of unlawful victimisation is not well founded and is accordingly dismissed.
 249. The Tribunal also considered the Claimant's complaint that the Respondent failed to make reasonable adjustments for him. We did not accept the submission of Ms Fraser-Butlin that the Claimant had to be treated as a person having past disability which would not place a duty on the Respondent to make reasonable adjustments for an individual with a past disability.  However, the Respondent had made a number of adjustments in relation to the investigation process, identified by Ms Fraser-Butlin in her submissions, namely limiting meetings to two hours, having breaks every hour, allowing the Claimant's wife to be present using written questions of the Claimant rather than interviews.
 250. The Claimant himself did not suggest that there were any particular adjustments which could be made. Further, although the Tribunal enquired on several occasions of the Claimant about the provision criterion or practice which placed him at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with those who were not disabled the Claimant was unable to identify any such PCP.
251. The Claimant's complaint of a failure on the part of the Respondent to make reasonable adjustments for him is not well founded and is accordingly dismissed.
 252. The Claimant also alleged harassment involving his suspension, the Penny Birmingham investigation, the approach taken to his grievances, and the second disciplinary investigation. The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent's treatment of the Claimant had been motivated by its intention to remove the Claimant from his role as Head Teacher in pursuance of which it continued his isolation from the school.
 253. Although we concluded that the conduct of the Respondent towards the Claimant throughout the entire process crossed the threshold into conduct which wholly undermined the employment relationship between the parties, we were unable to conclude that the Respondent's conduct, deplorable as it was in some instances, was on grounds of the Claimant's disability or on grounds of any protected act. We found no causative link between the conduct complained of, which the Claimant alleged amounted to unlawful discrimination on grounds his disability, and the Claimant's disability.
254. Notwithstanding our criticisms about the Respondent's conduct towards the Claimant we found no facts which could have led us to conclude that the Respondent's conduct was unlawful under the DDA in the absence of an adequate explanation from the Respondent.
 255. It is the unanimous judgment of the Tribunal that the Claimant's complaints of unlawful disability discrimination and victimisation are not well founded and are accordingly dismissed.
256. A Remedy Hearing will be listed.
Signed:        Employment Judge Hall-Smith
Date:           02 August 2011

Judgment and Reasons sent to the parties and entered in the Register on: 02 August 2011

Angela Shaw of Leslie Franks Solicitors commits criminal offences - read about it here!

ANGELA SHAW

Misconduct in Public Office

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on dates between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, wilfully neglected to perform her duty as an Officer of the Court and wilfully misconducted herself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder without reasonable excuse or justification.

Perverting the Course of Justice

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on dates between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, with intent to pervert the course of public justice, did a series of acts which had a tendency to pervert the course of public justice in that she:

1        deliberately ensured that a Client would be found guilty of a crime she knew his client not to have committed, according to the Law
2        wilfully failed to call a Witness as to Fact [Geoffrey Bacon] in a criminal trial
3        wilfully failed to call Warwick Brown [IT Manager of Faceparty] to a criminal trial when she knew that Mr Brown’s testimony would exonerate her Client
4        conspired with others to collapse a trial at Woolwich Crown Court in February 2009
5        provided false information to her Client, Brian Pead
6        conspired with others to harass Brian Pead
7        harassed Brian Pead between January 2009 and August 2013
8        failed to adduce more than 125 exhibits to a criminal trial
9        misled her Client when producing a Defence Statement of less than half a page for two criminal trials
10    failed to report perjury to the trial judge
11    was absent from her Client’s Trial save for two hours
12    was guilty of a lack of thorough preparation for the Trial
13    allowed a simple two paragraph Defence Statement to be produced which was ridiculed by the Judge as “…the worst Defence Statement I have ever seen…”
14    refused to take into account the various research materials the Defendant had produced and collated
15    refused to apply for a delay in the Trial date, despite the Defendant informing her that he was under orders from his doctor not to attend Trial because he was not ready for a trial and was on two separate forms of medicine which militated against him being fully prepared for Trial
16    refused to act on the Defendant’s complaints that Counsel was woefully under-prepared for Trial
17    failed to enter into Court a significant volume of evidence [more than 125 exhibits] which was vital to the Defendant’s case
18    failed to report allegations of demonstrable Perjury by police officers and Nicola Noone, a witness for the Crown
19    failed to report Gross Prosecutorial Misbehaviour, despite being informed of this in writing and verbally by the Defendant, and by a previous counsel working on the case prior to the new counsel’s appointment
20    failed to call an important Witness As To Fact: this Witness As To Fact [Geoffrey Bacon] was present when the Defendant sent an Instant Message to the ‘girl’ stating that he was a fake
21    failed to ensure that a significant volume of character statements from friends, colleagues and neighbours were signed and ready to enter into Court as important evidence
22    failed to address significant problems of a lack of Full Disclosure by the Crown and the Police
23    failed to challenge the authenticity of two search warrants
24    failed to challenge the existence of a third search warrant
25    failed to report the illegal disposal of vital evidence by the CPS, the Police and a Crown Witness
26    failed to adduce the Defendant’s beating by four police officers just months before the Trial and how they had searched his documents bag looking for evidence of the Defendant’s research into illegal Police online activities
27    failed to thoroughly read evidence supplied to him by the Defendant in his Defence
28    failed to report demonstrable police entrapment : police as Agents Provocateurs
29    failed to request reporting restrictions
30    failed to meet daily with her client for briefings during the Trial process
31    worked on too many cases simultaneously and failed to devote enough care and attention to the Defendant’s case
32    failed to report that a police informer was known to be supplying the police with deliberately false information
33    failed to organise the Defence witnesses: did not write to them, but left it to the Defendant to contact them and ask them to attend Court
34    failed to have questions prepared for a Witness for the Crown, and instead got the Defendant to prepare the questions and email them to Counsel the night before the Witness took the stand
35    failed to report Police perjury regarding the website to the attention of the Judge and Jury, despite having evidence of perjury
36    failed to apply for Full Disclosure, especially disclosure which would have proved the Defendant’s innocence beyond doubt
37    failed to report the Bexleyheath Police for failing to investigate an allegation and relying only on the testimony of three females of known dubious repute
38    failed to elicit a statement from the fourth female in the house, who refused to make a statement to the police
39    failed to subpoena this potential Witness, as she clearly had an important bearing on Indictment One
40    failed to communicate with the Defendant regarding photographs in Indictment One, and therefore allowed the wrong photographs to be entered into Court
41    despite possessing knowledge and evidence to the contrary, failed to report Police misbehaviour (breaches of PACE) on a number of counts
42    despite having evidence to the contrary, allowed false evidence to be entered into Court by the Police and Crown
43    despite having evidence to the contrary, failed to apply to the Crown and the Police for the correct evidence to be brought into Court
44    failed to apply for the Trial to be halted despite knowing that the wrong evidence was in Court
45    failed to request a copy of the website’s servers, which was necessary for a fair Trial
46    failed to request a copy of the Defendant’s computer hard drive at work which would have established the Defendant’s claim of innocence and provided a fair Trial
47    failed to establish as a fact that the Defendant had been researching into Child Sexual Abuse partly because he had been asked by his Line Manager to teach his work colleagues during Staff Training
48    failed to subpoena this Line Manager as a Witness and bring him into court to establish this important fact
49    failed to challenge the Crown’s statement that this Staff Training in Child Sexual Abuse did not take place, despite being shown considerable evidence to the contrary
50    failed to report the demonstrable fact that a Crown witness committed Perjury
51    failed to act when informed by the Defendant that his computer at work had been illegally tampered with
52    failed to act when informed by the Defendant that his research materials at work had been removed from the office servers
53    failed to write several letters requesting information from various sources (including the Police and the Crown), despite stating in conferences that she would write these letters
54    failed to inform Scotland Yard’s Professional Standards Unit that evidence in this case had been tampered with, despite possessing knowledge that it had been tampered with
55    failed to adduce examples of evidence tampering into Court
56    failed to procure the Defendant’s medical records to postpone the Trial until the Defendant was medically fit to stand Trial
57    wrongly advised the Defendant to withhold evidence (which the Defendant and supporters believed to be crucial evidence in his favour)
58    failed to provide a copy of the Crown’s Joinder argument to her Client, for consideration by his Client
59    failed to provide a copy of Defence counsel’s argument against Joinder for her Client to consider
60    made a threat to her own client – the Defendant – that “...If you continue to keep saying you’re innocent, the Judge will jail you…”
61    has deliberately misled the Registrar in the Appeals Court – by making claims as if they were facts, despite compelling evidence to the contrary
62    failed to provide her client with a Trial Bundle
63    failed to bring to the Court’s attention that the Jury was not sworn in
64    failed to contest the Judge’s duress towards the Jury
65    failed to bring to the Court’s attention that there was a significant breach of her Client’s Article 6 rights in that the case took 23 months to come to court, despite it not being a complex case


Harassment

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, did pursue a course of conduct amounting to the harassment of Brian Pead and did cause him and his daughter and grand-children alarm and distress contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.


Fraud by failing to disclose information

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, did commit fraud by deliberately failing to disclose documents to her client Brian Pead, to the police, to a Crown Court, and that she failed to report child grooming, racism, bullying, assault, false imprisonment, theft, and breaches of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006.


Fraud by abuse of position

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, did abuse her position as a Solicitor and Officer of the Court in that she (and others) perpetrated a series of crimes against Brian Pead during a corrupt trial at Southwark Crown Court in December 2009 and pursued a course of conduct amounting to the harassment of Brian Pead which she knew, or ought to have known, would cause him and his family alarm and distress, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.


Fraud by false representation

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, did make false representations and provide false documents to the Courts in relation to Brian Pead, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006.


Breaches of Computer Misuse Act 1990

That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, failed to report the modification of the contents of a computer used by Brian Pead in that they removed the contents of that computer’s hard drive, upon which were documents necessary for a bona fide criminal investigation and trial to take place contrary to section 3(1a) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.


Misuse of Public Funds


That Angela Shaw, a criminal solicitor of Leslie Franks Solicitors Limited (and formerly of AA Mirsons), on days between 01 January 2009 and 25 September 2013, did misuse public funds in perpetrating crimes against Brian Pead and in allowing crimes to be perpetrated against Brian Pead. She extracted monies from the public purse in the form of Legal Aid and misappropriated those funds by running a defence which she knew to be contrary to law and in allowing others to participate in an unlawful trial and the cover-up of significant crimes and human rights abuses.