FRAMED! - part 13

29

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is a vast piece of legislation covering all manner of sexual activity. It is always necessary, when being charged with any offence, to examine the law book and the precise wording of the charge. In this instance, the authors refer to Archbold and to the 2008 edition, since this is the relevant case law which was in existence during the period stated on the Charge Sheet (28 January 2008 through to 8 May 2008).

We make no apologies for devoting an entire chapter to this charge sheet alone because a robust and thorough examination of it must be made for the sake of accuracy and in the interest of justice.

It is first necessary to examine the wording of the alleged offence. Here is what Archbold – the lawyers’ bible - says about the offence:

“…10 Causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity

(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—

(a) he intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity,

(b) the activity is sexual, and

(c) either—

(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or

(ii) B is under 13.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section, if the activity caused or incited involved—

(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina,

(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis,

(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with anything else, or

(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis,

is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.

(3) Unless subsection (2) applies, a person guilty of an offence under this section is liable —

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years…”

It will have been noticed by the reader that in order for person A (in this case Brian Pead) to be guilty of an offence he must have caused or incited another person to engage in sexual activity and that person must be under 16. It will be evident that (a) there never was a 14-year-old girl (on the admission of the police) and that, since there never was a girl, Brian Pead could not possibly be guilty of such an offence, and that he was never guilty of such an offence despite what the police claimed and allowed to be published.

Although he was only charged under Section 10(1)(a), (b), (c)(1) and (2) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, we have included the entire part of the Act which specifically relates to incitement. The reason we have done this is to provide a full and transparent account. It will be seen by the reader that Section 10 of the Act relates to real victims – it describes rather graphically penetration of a victim’s various body parts. Since, as Roy Bacon so aptly described, this ‘girl’ was nothing more than a ‘fart in the wind’, how then could Brian possibly be guilty of any such offence? The answer, of course, is that he could not be. Section 10 of the Act relates to real victims.

Furthermore, Geoffrey Bacon had made a full statement in which he acknowledged that on 15 May 2008, Brian had told him that the ‘girl’ was a fake and that he thought the person to be a paedophile posing as a teenager.

Every crime needs two distinct elements:

(i)       the act itself (in legal terms actus reus), and

(ii)     an intention to commit the crime (the mens rea – sometimes referred to as the guilty mind, and more colloquially as ‘the motive’.)

It is clear from the evidence presented thus far that Brian Pead had neither committed an illegal act because there was no victim, and he certainly did not have any intention to commit such an act. His sexual proclivities do not extend to children.

We must now turn our attention to the following: “…Contrary to Section 1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981…”

What this relates to yet another sleight of hand created by some master magician higher than prosecutor Forster. He will not have been working alone. The Authors believe that this was being orchestrated at least as high as the level of Scotland Yard because of what Brian had uncovered at Lambeth and also because of what he (and others) were witnessing and had uncovered on the Faceparty website.

We must turn again to Archbold as we look at Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981:

“…1(1) – If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence…”

We must not concern ourselves with the rest of the Act, because Brian was charged under section 1(1) of the Act and no other section or sub-section.

It is clear, therefore, that – in order for a defendant to be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime – he or she must have the necessary intent to commit an offence (the mens rea).

We have seen in earlier chapters how Brian knew that he was not communicating with a 14-year-old girl, how he had told others offline (Geoffrey and Roy Bacon, Maya Walker) that he knew it was not a teenager, that he provided on three separate occasions a false mobile number and that he obviously had no intention of meeting any teenager for sex.

The evidence in support of Brian’s innocence and lack of intent to commit a crime, is overwhelming.

Staying with Archbold, on page 2976 of the 2008 Edition (the one relevant at the time of the alleged offences), it states at 34-70 that:

“…A person is guilty of incitement to commit an offence or offences if

(a) he incites another [person] to do or cause to be done an act or acts which, if done, will involve the commission of an offence or offences by the other (person) and

(b) he intends or believes that the other [person], if he acts as incited, shall or will do so with the fault required for the offence or offences…”

The emphases are the Authors’. As we have already shown, there has to be another person to incite and in this case, that person has to have been under the age of 16 and the defendant must intend or believe that the other person would commit a crime if incited to do so.

It is evident, therefore, that this did not relate to the circumstances in which Brian found himself at all. Firstly, he did not incite any ‘girl’ at all because there never was a girl. Secondly, by providing false mobile telephone numbers on three separate occasions, it is clear that he had no intention of meeting this person and was therefore, it follows, never going to be in a position to incite ‘the girl’.

Archbold, on page 2976, continues: “…the offence must be one which is capable of being committed by the person incited…”

(Our emphasis). The police claimed that Brian ‘incited’ a 14-year-old girl to commit sexual acts for money. Let’s assume, at this point, that they were right. If she did exist, and Brian had, for example offered a genuine 14-year-old girl money in return for sexual favours, it is clear that he would have been guilty of incitement. But there never was such a girl – she was a figment of the imagination of the police. Archbold clearly states that “the offence must be one which is capable of being committed by the person incited.” No girl. No incitement. The Law, not Brian Pead or the Authors of this book, clearly shows that Brian Pead was never guilty, nor could ever have been guilty, of any such offence.

And, by way of emphasis, section 34-72 on page 2976 of Archbold relates to the ‘mens rea’ of the offence of incitement:

                       

“…A person accused of incitement must be shown to have intended or believed that the person incited would, if he acted as incited to do, do so with the mens rea appropriate to the offence…”

Thus, in a nutshell, this means that Brian Pead must have intended or believed that the alleged 14-year-old would have carried out the sexual favours it was alleged he had incited. No girl. No incitement. No belief that there was ever a girl (see Geoffrey Bacon’s statement). All of which equates to Brian Pead’s undoubted innocence.

The Crown Prosecution Service relies heavily on Archbold. If the reader were to go along to any Magistrates’ Court – or even more specifically, any Crown Court (as we urge you to do so by sitting in the public gallery and really observe how trials are conducted) – you would often see them carrying around a large crimson-red book under their arm. This book will invariably be a copy of Archbold.

It is incredulous to think that Timothy Forster – the obsessive music collector and criminal barrister with 17 years’ experience, would not have turned to his Archbold and studied it before prosecuting Brian Pead.

However, if the reader feels that the duplicity and sleight of hand by CPS magicians ended here, then the reader would be wrong. And here comes a further legal lesson, for which we make no apologies. In fact, one of the purposes of this book is, we hope, to educate our readers in some of the finer points of the law and we hope that – if ever our readers find themselves in a position where they are being taken to court – they will have some basic skills with which to defend their position.

 We examined earlier Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981:

“…1(1) – If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence…”

We explained earlier that as Authors, we had taken the liberty of emphasising in bold the phrase “…with intent to commit an offence…”

Please bear with us as we now change the emphasis and place it on different words as we have done so below:

“…1(1) – If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence…”

Did you notice our sleight of hand? You ought to have done because we made you aware of it before we did it. The key phrase is now “…a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence …” and this is extremely pertinent because, by now, hopefully alarm bells will be ringing in your ears!

The phrase “…more than merely preparatory…” needs further explanation because it is extremely important to someone who has been charged with an attempt to commit an offence.

Thus we need to establish just what this phrase means, and we will give below some examples by way of illustration. All of this may sound simple to you, or it may sound confusing, but, either way, you would be surprised at the large numbers of people who wouldn’t look closely at the finer points of Statutes and, as a result, might become the victim of a miscarriage of justice. Even a single comma (,) can have an enormous impact on an understanding or interpretation of the law.

The language of the legal profession is what Basil Bernstein, the British sociologist (1924-2000), referred to as a ‘restricted code’. Within the restricted code, speakers draw on background knowledge and shared understanding. This type of code creates a sense of ‘includedness’, a feeling of belonging to a certain group. Restricted codes can be found among friends and families and other ‘closed’ groups including, for example, doctors, scientists or lawyers. The language that these groups of people use is not easily accessible to the ‘ordinary person’ – hence the term ‘restricted code’.

So, what precisely does the term “…more than merely preparatory…” mean? It is vital to know, especially where a person’s liberty might be at stake.

Firstly, we need to understand that an attempt to commit a crime is, by its very nature, an incomplete (or inchoate) offence. It is described as an attempt because the crime itself has not actually been committed.

Thus we say that a person is guilty of the inchoate offence of attempt if they take more than merely preparatory actions toward committing an offence, with the intention of committing it.

In English and Welsh law, it is possible to be convicted of a crime even where the full actus reus (act) of the crime has not been committed. These inchoate offences fall into three categories: incitement, conspiracy and attempts.

The term ‘inchoate’ means ‘incomplete’ and simply refers to the preliminary nature of the crimes.

The crime of attempt is found in section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which states that a person is guilty of attempting to commit an offence if he or she “does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of” the offence in question, with the intention to commit the offence. The mens rea of criminal attempts is therefore an intention to commit the offence in question.

At this point, the reader is asked to imagine if he (or she) is a member of the jury in the trial of Brian Pead at Southwark Crown Court in December 2009. As a member of that jury, can you honestly believe – given the information thus far - that he intended to commit an offence? He had merely communicated with a person claiming to be a 14-year-old girl and whom he knew not to be a teenager. There is sufficient evidence (from both Maya Walker and Geoffrey and Roy Bacon) that he knew this was not a teenager.

Furthermore, dear jury member, you also know that the Faceparty website claimed that no-one under 16 could access its site, so Brian could not have reasonably believed the person claiming to be a 14-year-old girl was actually that age.

And, of course, he had provided three false mobile telephone numbers and this fact alone (which the police corroborated because they tried calling the numbers and received no replies) demonstrates that Brian had no intention to meet this person.

Now, as an imaginary juror, can you say beyond reasonable doubt, that Brian Pead believed the ‘girl’ to be a ‘girl’, or that he had ever offered such a girl money in return for sexual favours? We believe that you could not possibly believe this on the evidence before you.

However, we must now examine the phrase ‘more than merely preparatory.’ What does ‘more than merely preparatory’ mean in law?

In the case of R. v Jones [1990], the Court of Appeal was asked to consider the meaning of the words “…more than merely preparatory…” in relation to the 1981 Criminal Attempts Act. In Jones, the court ruled that the statute does not limit liability for attempts to those who have undertaken all but the last act in a crime, as per the ruling in R. v Eagleton (1855).

Instead of following Eagleton, the court ruled that the test of whether an act was more than merely preparatory was an objective one; which the jury must decide on the facts of the case. As Lord Justice Taylor - the very same Lord Justice Taylor in the Hillsborough Inquiry - said in his decision, “the question … was whether there was evidence from which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that the appellant had done acts which were more than merely preparatory”.

Each case of attempt must therefore rest on its own facts, and it will be for the jury to determine whether the defendant has taken enough steps to have committed attempt rather than simply planned for the crime in question.

A person is guilty of attempt if, with the specific intention of committing a crime, he or she performs sufficient actions that a jury will determine they have committed acts ‘more than merely preparatory’ to the crime itself.

(The above explanation is based upon an article published on Suite101, which is one of the web’s largest independent publishers, and home to more than 20,000 experts, writers, teachers and travellers since 1996. Suite 101 is based in Vancouver, Canada.)

Did Brian Pead have the specific intention of committing a crime of inciting a child to commit a sexual offence? In order to answer this question, it would be sensible to ask “How could he have had an intention to commit an offence when he always knew that the alleged child was not a child but an adult, when he knew that no-one (according to the website and other information in the public domain) could access the website and when he had no intention of ever meeting this person (which we know because he provided this person with three false mobile phone numbers)?”

Please remember that the case had to be heard to the criminal standard – in other words the jury must believe that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. We believe that enough doubt exists already, but we will now examine the phrase ‘more than merely preparatory’ with reference to other cases to show how that phrase can be interpreted.

Two cases from 1990 will help us to show the meaning of the phrase. In the case of R. v Campbell (1990), the defendant had a fake gun, was wearing sunglasses and a crash helmet and had a threatening note in his pocket.  He was outside of a post office and was arrested when he was one yard away from entering the post office.

As he had not even entered the post office where he would have been in a position to carry out the offence, it was extremely unlikely that it could ever be said that he had performed an act which could have been classed as an attempt. He was found not guilty of attempted robbery.

On the face of it, it appears that Mr Campbell had taken steps to rob the post office. He had a fake gun. He had a threatening note. He was even outside a post office. These are, it would seem preparatory steps – he had, it would seem, prepared to rob the post office.

But had he actually done more than these mere preparatory steps?

The jury in that case obviously thought not, and they were right in the eyes of the law because Mr Campbell had not even stepped inside the post office and he had not, obviously, robbed it.

He may well have decided to rob the post office, and he may well have prepared to rob it, but he had not entered the building and that left room for doubt – he might, after all, have had second thoughts and walked away, or he might have been going to a fancy dress party as a bank robber. Who can say for certain? And a jury needs to be 100% certain in order to convict a defendant. Here is what the judge, Lord Justice Watkins, concluded:

“…In order to effect a robbery it is equally beyond doubt it would have been quite impossible unless obviously he entered the post office, gone to the counter and made some kind of hostile act - directed, of course, at whoever was behind the counter and in a position to hand him money. A number of acts remained undone and the series of acts which he had already performed - namely, making his way from his home where he commenced to ride his motor cycle on a journey to a place near a post office, dismounting from the cycle walking towards the post office door - were clearly acts which were, in the judgment of this court, indicative of mere preparation even if he was still of a mind to rob the post office, of the commission that is of the offence of robbery. If a person, in circumstances such as this, has not even gained the place where he could be in a position to carry out the offence, it is extremely unlikely that it could ever be said that he had performed an act which would properly be said to be an attempt…”

Compare that case with another case from 2009, that of R. v Jones. The defendant had bought a shotgun, sawed off the end of the barrel and test fired it. He later got into the back of the victim’s car with the gun.

Up until this point, he had – like Mr Campbell – taken steps that were merely preparatory and was therefore not guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

However, where this case differs from the Campbell case is that Mr Jones then pointed the gun at the victim. That one little act – of actually pointing the gun at the victim – was ‘…more than merely preparatory…’ because up until the moment he pointed the gun at the victim we can never be 100% certain that he had got into the car with a sawn-off shotgun with the intention of shooting the victim. He may, of course, have got into the car with the victim to shoot someone or something else. As it turned out, the gun was loaded but the safety catch was on. The victim was able to grab the gun and escape. 

Although the defendant still had to remove the safety catch and pull the trigger it was held that he had performed sufficient acts that were more than merely preparatory and he was guilty of attempted murder.

By pointing the gun at the victim, Mr Jones had crossed an imaginary threshold because we can be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that, by pointing a loaded gun at the victim, he had every intention of shooting him even though the safety catch was on.

By way of further illustration, we offer the reader one other case, that of R. v Geddes from 1996. The website www.lawteacher.net offers the following account of that trial:

“…The defendant had been seen by a teacher in the boys’ toilets of a school. He had no connection with the school and no right to be there. He had a rucksack with him. A police officer saw him and shouted at him, but he left. In a cubicle in the lavatory block there was a cider can which had belonged to the defendant. His rucksack was found in some bushes, containing a large kitchen knife, rope and a roll of masking tape. The defendant was arrested and identified by the teacher and some pupils. He was charged with attempted false imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the presence of the cider can showed that the defendant had been inside a toilet cubicle, and that the contents of the rucksack could have been used to catch and restrain a boy entering the lavatory. The defendant was convicted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal. It was held that the line of demarcation between acts which were merely preparatory and acts which might amount to an attempt was not always clear or easy to recognise. There was no rule of thumb test, and there must always be an exercise of judgment based on the particular facts of the case. It was an accurate paraphrase of the statutory test to ask whether the available evidence could show that a defendant had done an act which showed that he had actually tried to commit the offence in question, or whether he had only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so … In the present case there was not much room for doubt about the defendant’s intention, and the evidence showed that he had made preparations, had equipped himself, had got ready, had put himself in a position to commit the offence charged, but he had never had any contact or communication with any pupil at the school. On the facts of the case the evidence was not sufficient in law to support a finding that the defendant had done an act which was more than merely preparatory to wrongfully imprisoning a person unknown…”

We have included this third case to illustrate that – whilst Mr Geddes had ventured into a boys’ toilet block in a school with which he had absolutely no connection – and whilst he had made preparations by putting a knife, rope and a roll of masking tape into a rucksack, the Court of Appeal found that he had not done anything more than acts which were said to be merely preparatory. It would appear from the facts that whilst Mr Geddes had a certain motive (we, ourselves, cannot state with 100% certainty what that motive was), he had not spoken with any pupil at the school.

Had Mr Geddes spoken to a pupil, and had Mr Campbell actually ventured into the post office with his fake gun, these steps would have been ‘…more than merely preparatory…’

The difference between merely preparatory and an attempt can be defined by asking the question ‘has the defendant done an act which shows that he has actually tried to commit the offence in question, or... has he only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so?’

On the facts of the case the evidence was not sufficient in law to support a finding that the defendant had done an act which was more than merely preparatory to wrongfully imprisoning a person unknown.

Now we turn to the case against Brian Pead. He admitted to the police that he had chatted with the alleged ‘girl’. He also gave an honest account of his motives – that of ‘smoking this person out’ and reporting them to the management of the website.  This account was corroborated by Geoffrey and Roy Bacon – two men of great integrity. Brian’s account was also substantiated by other members of the public on blogs and forums about the demise of the company which owned Faceparty. He had – according to Geoffrey Bacon’s statement – told the ‘girl’ to “Fuck off!”

Now, for the purposes of illustrating a point, let us assume that Brian had intended to meet this alleged 14-year-old ‘girl’. In order for him to be found guilty of an offence of an attempt to incite ‘her’, we must ask the question “Did he take steps which were more than merely preparatory?”

Let’s examine the facts:

·         he had told ‘her’ to ‘fuck off’ and that she was ‘a fake’. This suggests that he knew beyond reasonable doubt that the ‘girl’ was not a 14-year-old at all and it suggests that he had no intention of ever meeting ‘her’ because if he had such an intention, why would he tell ‘her’ to ‘fuck off!’?

·         he had provided three false mobile phone numbers and, of course, if he had intended to meet ‘the girl’, he would have given ‘her’ a real number

·         he never went to meet anyone and, without meeting a real person, it would have been impossible for him to commit a crime

·         he never spoke to ‘her’ (as in the Geddes case)

·         he had given up the internet at his home

·         the ‘girl’ had initiated all of the conversations

·         there never was a ‘girl’ – so how could he possibly have taken steps which were more than merely preparatory if no such person ever existed?

We believe that no reasonable jury could possibly find Brian guilty based on the facts before them because there were several reasons why reasonable doubt existed and, of course, if doubt exists a jury is duty bound to find a defendant not guilty.

Now we must briefly return to the very charge itself:

“…Between 28 January 2008 and 8 May 2008 within the area of Central Criminal Court, London, being a person aged 18 or over, you attempted to intentionally caused or incited…”

The reader will see that we have added emphasis this time to the dates of the charge: “…Between 28 January 2008 and 8 May 2008…”

Another sleight of hand. Did you notice it?

In an earlier chapter, we showed you that in his interview on 4 June 2008 at Charing Cross police station, Brian Pead had told the officers that he had used Geoffrey Bacon’s computer on two consecutive Thursdays – 8 May and 15 May 2008 – because he no longer had the internet at home.

Look again at the dates in the charge. Where did the date of 15 May 2008 suddenly disappear to?

In his statement, Geoffrey Bacon stated that Brian Pead had used his computer on 15 May 2008 and that, on that very day, Brian had said, “You are a fake! Fuck off!” to someone who had messaged him.

Thus Thursday 15 May 2008 is a date which is agreed as a date on which Brian communicated with this ‘girl’. Why, then, did the police remove that date from their charge?

The reason might well astonish you.

Having unlawfully seized that computer which contained evidence of Brian’s innocence, the police returned it in November 2008 – some four months after having seized it.

During the mid-afternoon, Roy Bacon answered a knock at his front door. A female had his son’s computer tower in her arms. She placed it on the floor of the entrance hall, returned to the unmarked police car and drove away.

Roy Bacon was not asked to sign a receipt for the return of the computer. It was not in an evidence bag. There was no chain of custody.

Later that evening, Geoffrey Bacon returned home from a day’s building work. He was relieved to find that his computer had been returned because he needed it to operate his business.

He took it to his bedroom.

He connected all the wires.

He plugged it in.

It did not work.

The hard drive had been burnt out.

This was why the date of 15 May 2008 had not been entered into the charge against Brian Pead. The police had erased the message in which Brian had told the ‘girl’ that she was a ‘fake’ and that she should “fuck off”.

 Now, for the purposes of establishing incontrovertible evidence of police corruption in this matter, we provide a copy of the Crime Report [number 6104327/08] originally created on 9 June 2008 – some 5 days after Brian was interviewed at Charing Cross.

Note that – whilst at Lambeth – a host of allegations were created against him after he had dismissed a South African teacher calling herself Maryn Murray for grooming, racism and bullying.

Now, this crime report had been created (if we accept that it is a genuine crime report) after Brian Pead had been interviewed and no charges made against him.

At 14:25 on 9 June 2008, DC Julia M. Godfrey entered the following primary investigation details:

“...Between 28/1/2008 and 15/5/2008 the suspect has been communicating over the internet with a believed 14-year-old female (Covert Internet Investigator). Despite the ‘child’ reiterating her age on a number of occasions the suspect persistently turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, and on a number of occasions offered the ‘child’ money to perform sexual acts on him.

He was arrested on 04/06/08 at his home address for attempting to incite a child to engage in sexual activity…”

This is inaccurate in a number of ways and of vital importance in another way.

Notes the dates, the emphasis is ours: “…Between 28 January 2008 and 15 May 2008, the suspect has been communicating …”

This would indicate, would it not, that DC Godfrey believed – or had evidence – that Brian first communicated with the person claiming to be a ‘girl’ on 28 January 2008?

Furthermore, this would indicate, would it not, that DC Godfrey believed – or had evidence – that Brian finished communicating with the person claiming to be a ‘girl’ on 15 May 2008?

Indeed, Geoffrey Bacon produced a statement which corroborated this fact: that Brian did, indeed (on his own admission in the police station) communicate with the female for the first time on 28 January 2008.

Similarly, he also stated in the police station that he last communicated with this person on 15 May 2008 at Geoffrey Bacon’s house.

The police – or at the very least, DC Godfrey – agreed with those dates and she must have thought that these dates were accurate because she has entered them into the police national computer (PNC). One can make a reasonable assumption that she did not randomly pick a date (15 May 2008) out of thin air … she must have had a belief or intelligence that Brian had communicated with the person claiming to be a girl on 15 May 2008 because that is the date she entered into the PNC.

Now, given that DC Godfrey entered the date of 15 May 2008 as the last date on which Brian communicated with the ‘girl’ because there was considerable evidence which tallied with that date, we must assume that this date is correct.

Why, then, when he was charged on 16 February 2008, did the end date suddenly change to 8 May 2008?

We have to assume that it was not a mere typing error because to change the date from 15 to 8 suggests a significant and deliberate change. Had it been a typing error, she might have typed in 25 (of May 2008) instead of 15, or she might have typed in 14 or16 (of May 2008) because those digits are clearly on either side of the ‘5’ on a keyboard. It is also feasible – though less possible – that she might have typed in 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18 or 19 May 2008, but she did not.

She made a deliberate decision to change the 15 to an 8 (of May 2008).

Now, it is impossible to move on with our story without first recording why this was an unlawful – and we say, corrupt - step.

The reader will recall that the police (DC Godfrey was present) unlawfully seized a computer belonging to Geoffrey Bacon on 31 July 2008 and that they had not followed police protocol by placing the seized property in a bag, sealing it and attributing it with a unique number which would be recorded at the police station.

Now, the reader will also recall that – under interview – Brian Pead had been honest and he told the police (because he had nothing to hide) that he had used Geoffrey Bacon’s computer on 8 and 15 May 2008.

He had also told the police that on 15 May 2008, he had been contacted by the ‘girl’ – not the other way round – and that he had told the ‘girl’ that ‘she’ was a fake and that she could ‘fuck off’.

That message left a distinct digital footprint on Geoffrey Bacon’s computer. This footprint corroborated Brian’s version of events. The police, therefore, knew that Brian had told the truth – that he had been investigating Faceparty and that he was, therefore, a very dangerous man to them because – as Marcia Weise pointed out to him on 4 June 2008 at Charing Cross police station “You have out-stung the sting operation.” She also added, “They will be out to get you,” and they were.

They unlawfully seized Geoffrey Bacon’s computer, burnt out the hard drive and proof of Brian’s innocence, and then created false documents (in February 2009) to charge him using dates “between 28 January 2008 and 08 May 2008.”

The police were trying to re-write history and they were erasing the date of 15 May 2008 – the crucial date which proved Brian’s innocence beyond all reasonable doubt. They knew that, by retaining the date of 15 May 2008, they had no case at all against Brian. By omitting the critical date of 15 May 2008, they knew that the unlawful seizure of Geoffrey Bacon’s computer would not be mentioned in Brian’s forthcoming trial, even though DS Jason Tunn had told Geoffrey and Roy Bacon on 31 July 2008 “…We need to seize your computer because it could prove the guilt or innocence of Brian Pead…”

DS Tunn, DC Julia Godfrey and DC Rebecca Hall are all guilty of perverting the course of justice. They are also guilty of misconduct in public office, and they are all also guilty of breaches of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

DC Godfrey’s entry into the PNC included the following:

“…Suspect was taken to Charing Cross police station where he was interviewed. He admitted the communications, but stated he did not believe the female was really 14 and was only communicating with her to prove she was over 18…”

Notice that DC Godfrey adds that Brian Pead had admitted the communication. Had he been up to no good, it is inconceivable to think that he would have simply admitted communicating with the ‘girl’. He usually had numerous visitors to his house. He had a lover. Any one of his visitors or his lover could have logged on as Brian and communicated with the ‘girl’. This fact alone would have provided a jury with the reasonable doubt that a jury needs in order to acquit a defendant. Had he really been guilty, why would he have admitted to communicating with the ‘girl’? He could have denied ever communicating with the ‘girl’ and the police would not have been able to prove otherwise.

He wrongly believed that, by informing the police that he had been investigating this person and the Faceparty website, they would have taken this knowledge and added it to their intelligence database.

But they did not. In fact, what they actually did was to use Brian’s honesty against him and try to build a case against him when they knew him to be innocent because they had erased the communication between him and the ‘girl’ on 15 May 2008 from Geoffrey Bacon’s computer.

When Liverpool fans died at Hillsborough as a direct consequence of police mistakes, the police took blood samples from the dead fans in order to try to prove that they had been drunk and caused their own deaths.

They also examined the police national computer in order to try to find if the dead fans had criminal convictions in order to defame them.

How despicable can the police be? How low can they sink?

If you are reading this and thinking that – in the case of  Regina v Brian Pead – they could not sink any lower, then you would be wrong.

Very, very wrong.

According to the live Crime Report (CRIS: 6104327/08) which was marked ‘Dispose of as Confidential Waste’ on 31 July 2008, DC JM Godfrey (number 9411) added the following entry:

“…Further enquires (sic) are being undertaken in this matter.

I have applied for call data for the numbers shown on the chatlogs to be used in comparative analysis.

The IP address for the most recent computer useage (sic) by the e-mail address used by Brian Pead has returned to an address in Chislehurst. The occupier of this address, Geoffrey Bacon, is an associate of Brian Pead. A warrant has been obtained to retrieve any computer at the address for analysis…”

The emphasis is the authors’. DC Godfrey is claiming in this CRIS report that the police have obtained a warrant to search the house belonging to Roy Bacon, in Chislehurst.

The previous entry in the CRIS report before this one on 31 July 2008, was dated 11 June 2008 and no mention is made of any warrant being obtained between 11 June and 31 July 2008.

The entry after that of 31 July 2008 is dated 06 August 2008 and no mention is made of this warrant or the fact that it was ‘executed’ on 31 July 2008 at the house owned by Roy Bacon.

The entry after 06 August 2008 is dated 03 September and still no mention is made of any warrant or any house search or any materials being seized.

It is not until 29 September 2008 that the search of the Bacons’ house is mentioned in the CRIS report:

“…The warrant at Mr Bacons (sic) address was executed on 31/7/08 and computer seized. This has been examined and no further evidence obtained. Computer has been returned to owner…”  

 

The emphasis is the authors’. At this stage, the computer had not been returned to Geoffrey Bacon, so this is a false entry. If the computer belonging to Geoffrey Bacon had been examined as this entry claims, why is Geoffrey Bacon still waiting for a copy of the forensic report to which he is entitled? He had written at least twelve (12) letters to the police, to the Forensic company that the police used on Brian Pead’s computer, to his MP, to Brian’s MP, and to the brother of prime minister David Cameron, Alexander Cameron of 3 Raymond Buildings. Geoffrey Bacon initiated requests for a sighting of this alleged forensic report on his computer using both the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998. These Acts provide all citizens with certain rights – and Geoffrey Bacon is most certainly entitled to a copy of the alleged forensic report relating to his computer which was unlawfully seized on 31 July 2008 in a 10-minute house search.

It should also be remembered at this point that when the police arrived at the Bacons’ house, they were told by DS Tunn (the officer leading the search) “…We need the computer to prove whether in a trial your friend, Brian Pead, is innocent or guilty…”

Thus, the question has to be asked: “If the computer was that vital to both a police investigation and to a forthcoming trial, why has Geoffrey Bacon never received the Forensic Report relating to his computer?”

The answer, the authors believe, is that there was no forensic examination conducted on Geoffrey Bacon’s machine. The authors have strong evidence to show that the computer was unlawfully seized and that the hard drive was burnt out. On that hard drive was information proving Brian Pead’s innocence and demonstrating that the account he gave under interview on 4 June 2008 at Charing Cross police station was a truthful account. And the authors also believe that Marcia Weise, the legal representative from AA Mirsons who assisted Brian at Charing Cross police station, was correct in telling Brian “…You have out-stung the police’s sting operation…” and the authors also believe that Ms Weise was correct when she also told Brian “…and because you have out-stung their sting operation, they will be out to get you. You know too much…”

Another important question which must be asked in relation to this CRIS report entry by DC Godfrey is “Why did she wait to make this entry relating to the house search until two months after the search itself?”

And, “Why did she not mention the number of the Search Warrant, or which officers attended, or what items were seized?”

And, since she mentions that ‘no further evidence’ was obtained against Brian Pead, why did the police persist with re-bailing him each month?

By the time that the computer belonging to Geoffrey Bacon had been seized, the police had in their possession eight (8) computers that Brian Pead had used – six at his house, one at his place of work and one at Geoffrey Bacon’s house. No child pornography or other incriminating evidence had been found on any of these eight computers – so it is relatively safe to assume that we can discount that Brian has a propensity towards child pornography or that he has a propensity towards grooming children.

What reason, therefore, could the police have had for re-bailing him each month since his arrest on 4 June 2008? This was costing the taxpayer a large sum of money, and yet they state on their own records, that ‘no further evidence has been obtained’ against Brian.

Notice also how the entry by DC Godfrey on the CRIS report states that Geoffrey Bacon’s computer had been returned to him by 29 September 2008. This is a lie. Geoffrey and Roy Bacon claim – in statements – that the computer was not returned until November 2008. This is something that greatly affected Geoffrey’s business as a builder and the authors are therefore minded to believe the accounts of two men of great integrity (and with Home Office clearance to work as builders in police stations and Royal buildings) over the accounts of DC Godfrey and DS Tunn.

But the story concocted against Brian by the police becomes even more full of holes when Geoffrey and Roy Bacon wrote (using the Freedom of Information Act and the Data Protection Act) to the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to obtain a copy of the police submission to the magistrate in order to obtain a warrant on his house.

The Magistrates’ Court has continually refused to provide a copy of the submission by the police. The police have continually refused to provide a copy. Bob Neill, MP for the Bacons’, has also refused to co-operate on behalf of his constituents. James Brokenshire, the MP for Sidcup and Old Bexley (Brian’s MP) also refused to help and when Brian moved to Southend, his MP became James Duddridge and when Brian wrote to him with ‘incontrovertible evidence of police corruption’, Duddridge wrote back “…Do not correspond with me again. I hope I have made my position clear…”

The authors believe that the search warrant was bogus and that there never was a submission by the police to obtain a warrant.

Furthermore, the authors believe that the only reason they wanted the computer belonging to Geoffrey Bacon was to permanently erase the digital footprint which would prove Brian Pead’s innocence.

Their motive? Consider the wise words of Marcia Weise – “…You have out-stung their police sting operation and they will be out to get you. You know too much…”   

In this chapter, we have provided incontrovertible evidence of police (and, we believe judicial) corruption. At this point in the account we reserve judgment on the alleged Magistrate’s corruption, but judicial corruption will enter this account in the following chapters.

  In the meantime, the next chapter deals with the law around incitement and attempts at incitement, because it is important that we return to this aspect of Brian’s account.